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HANS OFF!: THE STRUGGLE FOR HANS 
ISLAND AND THE POTENTIAL 
RAMIFICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL 
BORDER DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Christopher Stevenson*
Abstract: As global warming continues to warm the Arctic seas, more of 
the Arctic is free of ice for longer periods. The possibilities for exploita-
tion of natural resources and for control over Northern shipping lanes 
have prompted countries’ renewed interest in their competing claims to 
the region. Recently, Denmark and Canada have clashed over their com-
peting claims to a small, uninhabitable rock known as Hans Island. While 
this island may not seem signiªcant, the eventual resolution of this border 
dispute may have widespread ramiªcations for the resolution of interna-
tional conºicts in other remote, uninhabited areas. This Note examines 
the International Court of Justice decisions in a number of border dis-
pute cases, applies that jurisprudence to the Hans Island facts, and urges 
both parties to reach an equitable solution. 
Introduction 
 On July 20, 2005, Bill Graham, the Foreign Defense Minister of 
Canada, made a helicopter trip to a small, rocky island in the Davis 
Strait, which separates Canada’s Ellesmere Island from Greenland.1 
The short visit, which followed a Canadian military ºag planting and 
Inukshuk2 raising on the island, raised diplomatic tensions between 
Canada and Denmark.3 Danish ofªcials labeled the move an “occupa-
                                                                                                                      
* Christopher Stevenson is a Managing Editor of the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 Brian Laghi, Graham Visit to Arctic Island Causes Icy Spat with Denmark, The Globe and 
Mail, July 26, 2005, at A1; Canada, Denmark Dispute Ownership of Tiny Arctic Island, CBC News 
Online, July 26, 2005, http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2005/07/25/hansisland 
050725.html [hereinafter Disputed Ownership]; Canadian Geographic, Whose Hans?, The 
Hans of Time, http://www.cangeo.ca/hansIsland/time.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2005) [here-
inafter Hans of Time]; Canada Island Visit Angers Danes, BBC News UK Edition, July 25, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe 4715245.stm [hereinafter Visit Angers Danes]. 
2 A traditional Inuit stone marker. See Laghi. supra note 1. 
3 See Laghi, supra note 1; Disputed Ownership, supra note 1; Hans of Time, supra note 1. 
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tion,”4 ªled an ofªcial protest, and sent their own military expedition 
to the island.5 The two countries decided to discuss their disagree-
ment and, on September 19, 2005 agreed to a “truce” in the dispute.6
 In early 2006, however, Conservative Stephen Harper was sworn 
in as Canada’s new Prime Minister.7 Harper’s campaign had promised 
increased assertion of the country’s sovereignty over Arctic territories 
through the construction of three heavy icebreaking ships, a northern 
deepwater port, and an underwater network of listening posts.8
 The events of 2005 and 2006 were only the latest acts in a dispute 
that has simmered since 1973.9 Although both countries assert that the 
issue is simply one of national sovereignty, there is speculation that the 
desire to exploit the natural resources of the region and control the 
passage of ships through the soon to be ice-free Northwest Passage may 
be playing a major role in the intensifying struggle for the island.10
 This Note will summarize the recent history of Hans Island and 
the origins of the competing claims of Canada and Denmark. It will 
explore possible factors behind the recent escalation of diplomatic hos-
tilities. After an examination of the three rationales the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) employs when deciding such disputes, the Note 
                                                                                                                      
4 Anne McIlroy, Hans Off My Island, Guardian Unlimited, Aug. 30, 2005, available at 
http://guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,1559064,00.html (last visited Oct. 
2, 2005); Denmark Calls for Talks on Arctic Island Dispute, CTV.ca, July, 28, 2005, http://www.ctv. 
ca/servlet/Article-News/story/CTVNews/1122473659796_117882859? s_name=&no_ads=. 
5 See McIlroy, supra note 4; Hans of Time, supra note 1. 
6 Canada, Denmark Reach Truce on Island, Seattle Times, Sept. 20, 2005, at A2 [herein-
after Truce]; Canada, Denmark Agree to Hans Island Process, CTV.ca, Aug. 19, 2005, 
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1127148182767_122557382/?hu
b=CTVNewsAt11 [hereinafter Agreement]; Denmark, Canada to Negotiate over Disputed Arctic 
Island, CBC News Online, Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2005/ 
08/08/hans-island-050808.html [hereinafter Disputed Island]; In Depth: It’s a Fine Line, CBC 
News Online, August 9, 2005, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/boundary_disputes/ 
[hereinafter Fine Line]. 
7 Harper Sworn in as 22nd Prime Minister, CBC News, Feb. 6, 2006, http://www. 
cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2006/02/06/harper-ottawa060206.html. 
8 Harper Brushes off U.S. Criticism of Arctic Plan, CBC News, Jan. 26, 2006, http://www. 
cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2006/01/26/wilkins-harper060126.html. 
9 Disputed Island, supra note 6; Visit Angers Danes, supra note 1. 
10 See McIlroy, supra note 4; Alexander Rubin, Hands off Hans Island, Canada Free 
Press, July 27, 2005, available at http://www.canadafreepress.com/2005/rubin072705.htm; 
Agreement, supra note 6; Canadian Geographic, Whose Hans?, Hans’ History, http://www. 
cangeo.ca/hansIsland/background.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Hans’ His-
tory]; Canada Has Claim to Hans Island: Pettigrew, CTV.ca, Aug. 20, 2005 http://www.ctv.ca/ 
servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1124451989435_49/?hub=Canada; Dianne DeMille, 
Denmark ‘Goes Viking’ in Canada’s Arctic Islands—Strategic Resources of the High Arctic Entice the 
Danes, Canadian American Strategic Review, Mar. 2005, http://www.sfu.ca/casr/id-
arcticviking1.htm. 
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will explain how this case presents a unique challenge for the court be-
cause, under traditional ICJ jurisprudence, a decision in either coun-
try’s favor based on recent visits to the island is not in the best interest 
of the parties or the international community. The best scenario, in the 
absence of a negotiated political solution, may be an equitable division 
of the disputed land. 
I. Background 
 The history of possession of the land surrounding the Davis Strait 
is long and interesting.11 Canada claims Ellesmere Island and the rest 
of its Arctic possessions on the basis of the British Adjacent Territories 
Order, which gave Canada all of Britain’s Arctic possessions on Sep-
tember 1, 1880.12 The United States claimed the Northern portions of 
Greenland adjacent to the Island until it relinquished those claims as 
part of its agreement to purchase the Danish West Indies from Den-
mark in 1917.13 Denmark gained the rest of Greenland in a 1933 de-
cision of the Permanent Court of International Justice and has main-
tained it as a semi-autonomous possession ever since.14
 By most accounts, the ªrst western explorer to discover and name 
Hans Island was American Charles Francis Hall.15 Hall, on an expedi-
tion to the North Pole, noted the tiny island and named it after his 
Inuit guide from Greenland, Hans Hendrik.16 There is little subsequent 
history surrounding the island itself until 1971 when, in the middle of 
discussions to determine the boundary between itself and Greenland, 
Canada ªrst claimed sovereignty over Hans.17 Denmark did and has 
since disputed this claim for a number of reasons, including: its belief 
that the island was discovered by Hans Hendrik himself; certain geo-
logical similarities between Greenland and Hans Island; and evidence 
                                                                                                                      
11 See e.g. Hans of Time, supra note 1. 
12 Adjacent Territories Order, 1880 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 11, No. 14. 
13 See Treaty on Cession of Danish West Indies, U.S.-Den., Aug. 4, 1916, 39 Stat. 1706. 
14 See Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland (Nor. v. Den.), 1933 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), No. 55, (May 11). 
15 See Hans of Time, supra note 10; Kenn Harper, Hans Island Rightfully Belongs to 
Greenland, Denmark, Nunatsiaq News, Apr. 9, 2004, available at http://www.nunatsiaq. 
com/archives/40521/opinionEditorial/opinions.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). But see 
Letter from Poul E.D. Kristensen, Ambassador of Denmark, to the Ottawa Citizen, ( July 
28, 2005), available at http://www.ambottawa.um.dk/en/ menu/PressAndCulture/News/ 
ArticleabouttheHansIslandissue.htm (stating that, in Denmark’s opinion, the expedition 
was conducted in agreement with Danish authorities) (last visited Oct. 2, 2005) [hereinaf-
ter Kristensen]. 
16 Harper, supra note 15; Hans’ History, supra note 10. 
17 See Harper, supra note 15; Kristensen, supra note 15. 
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that Inuit populations native to Greenland may have used the island in 
the past.18 The resulting treaty reºects the two countries’ inability to 
agree on the issue.19
A. The 1973 Delimitation Treaty 
 The boundary discussions culminated with the two countries 
signing an agreement on the delimitation of the Continental Shelf on 
December 17, 1973.20 This treaty established the dividing line in the 
“area between Greenland and the Canadian Arctic Islands . . . for the 
purpose of each Party’s exploration and exploitation of the natural 
resources” of the shelf.21
 The agreement draws the borderline between Canada and 
Greenland by connecting the midpoints of 127 straight baselines sur-
veyed between the coasts of the two countries by the Canadian Hydro-
graphic Service in 1964 and 1972.22 The line is unbroken except for an 
857 meter gap between point 122 (lat. 80° 49’ 2, long 66° 29’ 0) and 
point 123 (lat. 80° 49’ 8, long. 66° 26’ 3).23 Hans Island sits in this 
gap.24 Unable to agree on ownership of the island during negotiations, 
the two countries simply decided to stop the border at the low water 
mark on one side of the island and restart it again at the low water 
mark on the opposite side.25
B. Visitors to Hans Island 
 The treaty having left the issue of Hans’ ownership unclear, both 
Denmark and Canada have seen ªt to embark on visits to the island in 
the ensuing years.26 Canadian interests seem to have made the ªrst 
move—a series of research trips to the island by Dome Petroleum in 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Kristensen, supra note 15; Jane George, Greenland, Canada Squabbling over Pet Rock, 
Nunatsiaq News, Apr. 9, 2004, available at http://www.nunatsiaq.com/archives/4040/ 
news/nunavut/40409_08.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2005); Harper, supra note 15. 
19 See Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Gov-
ernment of Canada relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between 
Greenland and Canada, Den.-Can., Dec. 17, 1973, 950 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Delimita-
tion Treaty]; Harper, supra note 15; Rubin, supra note 10. 
20 See Delimitation Treaty, supra note 19. 
21 Id. art. 1. 
22 See id. art. 2. 
23 See id. 
24 See id. Annex 3. 
25 See Harper, supra note 15; Fine Line, supra note 6. 
26 See Hans of Time, supra note 1. 
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1981 and 1983 to study the island’s ability to withstand the force of 
Arctic ice ºoes.27
 After learning of this visit by the Canadians, the Danish govern-
ment decided to undertake its own expedition to the island.28 On July 
28, 1984, Tom Høyem, Denmark’s minister of Greenlandic Affairs, 
ºew to the island.29 Høyem reportedly planted a Danish ºag on the 
island and started a new visitor tradition by leaving a bottle of aquavit 
behind.30 The Danish military returned to the island in 1988, 1995, 
2002, and 2003.31 Each time, they planted a new Danish ºag.32
 In 2000, a team of geologists from the Geographical Society of 
Canada ºew to Hans while on a trip to map Ellesmere Island.33 They 
took geological samples from the island and mapped its location.34 In 
2005, members of the Canadian armed forces visited the island in ad-
vance of Bill Graham’s visit.35 They planted a Canadian ºag and built 
and Inukshuk.36
C. Why Fight Over Hans Island and Why Now? 
 While there are no known deposits of oil, natural gas, gold, or 
other minerals on Hans Island, there is speculation that the seaºoor 
under the surrounding waters could contain such natural resources.37 
As global warming has heated the Arctic seas, the waterways between 
Canada and Greenland have become navigable throughout more of 
the year.38 The countries have seized this opportunity to conduct re-
search into possible oil and gas reserves, and Denmark has already 
licensed some of the area on its side of the Davis Strait for oil explora-
                                                                                                                      
27 See Harper, supra note 15; Hans of Time, supra note 1. 
28 See Harper, supra note 15. 
29 See id.; Hans of Time, supra note 1; Visit Angers Dane, supra note 1. 
30 Id. Aquavit is a popular Danish alcoholic beverage. When Canadians visit Hans Island, 
they now leave behind a bottle of Canadian whisky. See Martin O’Malley, Look Ma, No Hans, 
CBC News, July 29, 2005, http://www.cbc.ca/news/viewpoint/vp_omalley/20050729.hml 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2005). 
31 Hans of Time, supra note 1. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.; George, supra note 18. 
34 George, supra note 18. 
35 Hans of Time, supra note 1. 
36 Holly Bridges, Raising the Canadian Flag on Hans Island, http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/ 
news/2005/07/27_e.asp; Hans of Time, supra note 1. 
37 See McIlroy, supra note 4; DeMille, supra note 10. 
38 See McIlroy, supra note 4; DeMille, supra note 10. 
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tion—though, interestingly, the purchaser of this license is EnCana 
Corporation, a Canadian company.39
 Global warming is also responsible for a second possible reason 
that interest in controlling the island is so strong.40 The warmer Arctic 
sea temperatures bring with them the promise that the Northwest sea 
passage will become passable throughout the year.41 Should this hap-
pen, the amount of shipping through the Arctic will increase dramati-
cally and could represent a lucrative revenue source for whichever 
country regulates passage.42 Other countries, such as the United States, 
have already asserted their belief that the waters are international terri-
tory and have made their own, unannounced trips to the area.43
II. Discussion 
 The clear preference for most countries involved in territorial dis-
putes is to solve their disagreements through political means.44 On sev-
eral occasions, however, countries have decided to submit their disputes 
to third parties for binding legal settlements.45 Such a decision can 
stem from, inter alia, a treaty commitment to peaceful dispute resolu-
tion, the desire to acquire international legitimacy in the ªnal out-
come, or simply the inability of the parties to negotiate an agreement 
on their own.46
 Although the International Court of Justice is not the only third 
party available to parties engaged in territorial disputes, it has become a 
more popular choice of late.47 It has heard many different border dis-
putes and, while complicated and often lengthy (the border dispute be-
tween Bahrain and Qatar is the longest case ever heard by the court),48 
                                                                                                                      
39 DeMille, supra note 10. 
40 See McIlroy, supra note 4; The Honourable Pierre Pettigrew, Canada’s Leadership in 
the Circumpolar World, Remarks at the Northern Strategy Consultations Round Table on 
Reinforcing Sovereignty, Security, and Circumpolar Cooperation (Mar. 22, 2005), available 
at http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?publication_id=382497&Lang 
uage=E. 
41 See McIlroy, supra note 4; Rubin, supra note 10. 
42 See McIlroy, supra note 4; Rubin, supra note 10. 
43 See McIlroy, supra note 4; Rubin, supra note 10. 
44 Beth Simmons, See You in “Court”? The Appeal to Quasi-Judicial Legal Processes in the Set-
tlement of Territorial Disputes, in A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of Int’l 
Conºict 205, 209 (Paul F. Diehl, ed., 1999). 
45 Id. at 205. 
46 See id. at 208–13. 
47 See id. at 205–06 and app. 1. 
48 Press Release, I.C.J., Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar 
and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Press Release 2001/9 (Mar. 16, 2001). 
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the decisions in these cases offer valuable insight into the bases of bor-
der dispute resolution and display a relatively predictable pattern of de-
cision.49 With this in mind, and with Canada and Denmark no closer to 
agreeing about the island’s ownership, the possibility of the dispute be-
ing tried before the International Court of Justice looms and it is impor-
tant for both countries to consider how the ICJ would analyze this 
case.50
 The court gives the most weight to territorial claims that are backed 
by treaty.51 Unless they are somehow defective, treaties are considered 
binding on the parties that have entered into them and are dispositive 
when they reºect past agreement on international boundaries.52
 In a dispute between Belgium and the Netherlands, for example, 
the court considered both an 1843 Boundary Convention establishing 
the border between the countries and the claim that Belgium, although 
granted the territory in the treaty, had effectively ceded control over 
the area to the Netherlands.53 The Netherlands had been collecting 
taxes and registering births, deaths, marriages, and property trans-
fers.54 It even sold a plot of land in the disputed area.55 The court 
found the treaty dispositive, however, and held that Belgium had not 
ceded its rights to the territory simply because of the Netherlands’s 
“routine and administrative” acts.56
 When there is no clear delimiting of a disputed border by way of a 
treaty between the two parties, the ICJ proceeds to consider the doc-
                                                                                                                      
49 See generally Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 
53 Duke L.J. 1779, 1781 (2004) (explaining the hierarchical approach to fact analysis used 
by the I.C.J when deciding such cases). 
50 See, e.g., Press Release, Secretary-General Congratulates Bahrain and Qatar on Reso-
lution of Territorial Disputes, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7751 (Mar. 23, 2001) (congratulating 
Bahrain and Qatar for settling their border dispute through the ICJ and stating that it is an 
excellent example to other States of how disputes of this nature should be resolved). 
51 Sumner, supra note 49, at 1782, 1804; see also Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ 
ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm. [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (stating that the court, when deciding 
international law disputes, shall apply “international conventions, whether general or par-
ticular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states”). 
52 See Sumner, supra note 49, at 1804. 
53 Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land (Belg. v. Neth.), 1959 I.C.J. 209, 221–22,227 
( June 20). 
54 Id. at 228–29. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 229; see also Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 37–39, 40 (Feb. 
3) (holding it unnecessary to consider uti possidetis, inherited title, or spheres of inºuence 
arguments because a treaty clearly deªned all borders in dispute). 
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trine of uti possidetis.57 This type of claim generally arises when the two 
countries in dispute were once colonies of the same country.58 There 
are frequently no formal treaties deªning the colonial borders, merely 
administrative boundaries, so, under the doctrine, these boundaries are 
deemed to be functionally equivalent to international borders.59
 In the case of Bahrain and Qatar’s dispute over possession of the 
Hawar Islands, for instance, the court examined a ruling by the Brit-
ish courts from 1939.60 That decision, made when both countries 
were British possessions, clearly granted ownership of the islands to 
Bahrain.61 The ICJ accepted that judgment and held that the islands 
still belonged to Bahrain.62 Bahrain and Qatar were also contesting 
possession of the island of Janan in their dispute.63 The court found 
no reference to Janan in the British decision of 1939 and instead re-
lied on a 1947 British declaration that the grant of the Hawar Islands 
to Bahrain did not include Janan to make their determination that 
Janan belonged to Qatar.64 Although Bahrain put forth an effective 
control argument that the ªshermen of Janan were required to obtain 
Bahraini permission before constructing huts on the island, that ar-
gument was not considered in the court’s decision.65
 When there is no documentation of a territory’s ownership ei-
ther through treaty or uti possidetis or when that documentation is 
ambiguous, the court looks at the customary use of the area by the 
countries disputing ownership to see if either has established effective 
control over the territory.66 Effective control has been described by 
one commentator as “continuous administration and effective occu-
pance of the land; ideally, the territory should be settled throughout 
and the natural resources of the area should be developed and 
                                                                                                                      
57 Sumner, supra note 49, at 1804. Uti possidetis is a doctrine under which newly inde-
pendent states inherit the preindependence administrative boundaries established by the 
former colonial power. Id. at 1790. 
58 See Sumner, supra note 49, at 1790–91. 
59 See id. 
60 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.) 2001 I.C.J. 40, 83–
84 (Mar. 16). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 89–91. 
64 Id. at 90–91. 
65 See id. at 87, 90–91; see also Land, Island and Maritime Dispute (El. Sal. v. Hond.: 
Nicar. intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 356, 391–93 (Sept. 11) (ªnding, in a case where a 
treaty failed to describe a disputed area, that Spanish documents indicating jurisdictions or 
territorial limits, where found, established the international border). 
66 See Sumner, supra note 49, at 1804–05. 
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used.”67 It has also been described in a broader sense as “a certain de-
gree of political, military, or administrative power deemed appropri-
ate in the given conditions and varying from case to case according to 
circumstances.”68 This second formulation—that of adjusting the 
amount of control necessary to assert sovereignty based on the cir-
cumstances—is what the court has been using.69
 The ICJ resorted to an evaluation of effective control, for exam-
ple, in a dispute between France and the United Kingdom over con-
trol of two English Channel islands.70 There were no colonial borders 
because the islands had never been considered colonies of either 
country, and the court rejected claims of feudal land grants and ªsh-
eries agreements as nondispositive on the border issue.71 Instead it 
found that the British government had exercised sovereign jurisdic-
tion over both island groups through a number of administrative acts, 
such as holding judicial proceedings, establishing local ordinances 
regarding the handling of corpses, levying taxes, licensing commercial 
boats, registering deeds to property, and conducting censuses.72 Be-
cause it had exercised this control, the United Kingdom was awarded 
sovereignty over the islands.73
 In the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over control of the 
islands of Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, however, the court used a 
less stringent standard to determine effective control.74 The court be-
gan its analysis by examining an 1891 agreement between the British 
and the Dutch, but found that it did not address the boundary area 
around the islands in question.75 Finding no other boundary authority, 
the court examined the countries’ competing claims of effective con-
trol.76 It found that Indonesia’s claims were insufªcient to establish au-
thority, but that Malaysia’s regulation of the commercial collection of 
turtle eggs, its establishment of a bird sanctuary, and its construction of 
                                                                                                                      
67 Andrew Burghardt, The Bases of Territorial Claims, 63 Geographical Rev. 225, 229 
(1973). 
68 Yehuda Z. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law 101 (1965). 
69 Compare Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 65–66, 67–69 (Nov. 17) 
(requiring a great deal of administrative authority on heavily inhabited islands), with Sov-
ereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.) 2002 I.C.J. 625, 684–85 
(Dec. 17) (requiring far less control of sparsely inhabited islands). 
70 See Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. at 65–66, 67–69. 
71 See id. at 59, 60–63, 65–69. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 72. 
74 See Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, 2002 I.C.J. at 684–7-85. 
75 See id. at 652–53. 
76 See id. at 678. 
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light houses were all that were required to demonstrate effective con-
trol.77 Although these activities fell short of the standard set in Min-
quiers and Ecrehos, the court found them sufªcient in the context of 
the disputed islands and awarded the islands to Malaysia.78
 If it ultimately decides that there is insufªcient evidence of effec-
tive control, it is unlikely that the ICJ will move on to consider the 
countries’ geographical, economic, historical, ideological or cultural 
claims.79 Although it has frequently heard such claims, the court’s ju-
risprudence in territorial disputes is conspicuously void of reference to 
these issues.80 Instead, the court has shown a preference to decide such 
cases under equitable principles.81 If both parties agree to let the ICJ 
decide a case ex aequo et bono, the court is free to decide the case in the 
manner most equitable to both parties.82 Even without such an agree-
ment, the court can resort to the similar principle of equity infra legem.83
III. Analysis 
 In resolving the Hans Island dispute, the International Court of 
Justice would ªrst look for treaty evidence establishing the border be-
tween Canada and Greenland.84 No agreements exist between any 
other countries who may have had claims to the area before Denmark 
and Canada, so the only treaty upon which the court could rely is the 
1973 Delimitation Treaty.85 As discussed previously, however, the border 
described by this treaty is not established around Hans Island.86 The 
treaty, therefore, would not be viewed as dispositive by the court.87
 Without conclusive treaty evidence, the ICJ would examine the 
possibility of uti possidetis.88 A showing of uti possidetis would require 
one side or the other to show that the area encompassing Northern 
Greenland, Hans Island, and Ellesmere Island was once controlled by 
                                                                                                                      
77 See id. at 683–85. 
78 See id.; Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 65–66, 67–69 (Nov. 17). 
79 See Sumner, supra note 49, at 1806–07. 
80 See id. at 1807. 
81 Id. at 1806. 
82 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 2, June 26, 1945, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasic (allowing the Court decide a case ex aequo et bono, if 
the parties agree thereto). 
83 See Sumner, supra note 49, at 1797–98; see also Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 
1986 I.C.J. 554, 567–68 (Dec. 22). 
84 See Sumner, supra note 49, at 1804. 
85 Delimitation Treaty, supra note 19. 
86 See id. at annex 3. 
87 See Sumner, supra note 49, at 1804. 
88 See id. 
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a single nation and that that nation employed administrative bounda-
ries that could translate into current international borders.89 As stated 
above, the Canadian Arctic islands were British possessions that were 
transferred to Canada in 1880.90 It is unclear whether Hans Island was 
part of that transfer.91 Greenland, however, was clearly not part of the 
British possession at the time because its Southern areas were con-
trolled by Denmark and the Northern area around Hans Island was 
claimed by the United States until 1917.92 Because the entire area was 
never under a single country’s control and because, therefore, no co-
lonial boundaries exist, there can be no ªnding of uti possidetis.93
 Unable to ªnd a basis for decision under either treaty or the doc-
trine of uti possidetis, the court’s examination of the merits would shift 
to effective control.94 The question here, of course, is how much ef-
fective control will be found to be sufªcient to base a claim of sover-
eignty over an Arctic island.95
 Clearly, permanent settlement of Hans is not feasible and, if there 
are no natural resources in the area, Canada and Denmark cannot be 
expected to assert their sovereignty through their development and use 
of them.96 In the case of Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, however, the 
court showed that it is willing to adjust its effective control require-
ments to ªt the situation at hand.97 Thus, in Pulau, the establishment 
of a bird sanctuary was a sufªcient exercise of control on a sparsely in-
habited island, while in Minquiers and Erehos, more populated islands, 
a greater showing of control was necessary.98 The ICJ may well decide 
that periodic military visits and erections of stone markers are sufªcient 
exercises of control for an uninhabited and largely inaccessible rock in 
the middle of the Arctic.99 Such a decision, far from being a boon to 
either Canada or Denmark, would have disastrous consequences for 
both countries and their attempts to assert sovereignty in other parts of 
the Arctic. 
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 A decision granting either party sovereignty over Hans Island 
would set a dangerous precedent for other countries seeking to gain 
possession of remote territories. Essentially, it would send the message 
that uninhabited areas are available to the country which can make 
the most visits there. The ensuing land rush will be particularly no-
ticeable in the Arctic, as a number of countries with competing claims 
in the region have become increasingly interested in enforcing those 
claims as global warming has made the area more accessible.100 Rus-
sia, for instance, has begun to lay claims to other areas of the Arctic 
currently claimed by Denmark.101 The United States also makes fre-
quent naval forays to the Arctic and could potentially use these trips 
as a basis for sovereignty claims.102
 If ever there were a case for the ICJ to decide in equity, it is this 
one.103 The court should reject both Denmark’s and Canada’s claims of 
effective control as inadequate and award possession of the island un-
der an equitable solution.104 This solution could be as simple as divid-
ing the island in two by drawing a straight line between the delimitation 
points on either side of the island, or as complex as the court should 
decide necessary.105 Whatever the ultimate form of the division, a deci-
sion in equity would send a clear signal that the sovereignty of uninhab-
ited lands will not be handed to whichever country can make the most 
frequent visits.106 This will, in the end, protect the interests of not only 
Canada and Denmark, but also those of many other nations whose pos-
sessions include remote, uninhabited areas.107
Conclusion 
 This examination of the probable outcome of an ICJ analysis of 
the Hans Island dispute should assist both parties in assessing the 
strengths of their respective claims. Both should note that time and 
money spent developing cultural claims, such as former Inuit use of the 
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Island, and geographical claims, such as similarity to Greenland,108 are 
not likely to yield effective arguments for sovereignty. In 2005, Canada 
and Denmark seemed to realize that the best result may come from 
working together when they announced that they would be cooperat-
ing in a new geographical study of the area.109 Recently, however, Can-
ada signaled that it may be changing its position by issuing a Vancouver 
geologist a prospecting permit for the island.110 Hopefully cooperation 
will prevail and lead to an agreeable solution and settle international 
tensions in this increasingly important part of the world. 
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